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INVISIBLE-HAND EXPLANATIONS RECONSIDERED 
Abstract 
Edna Ullmann-Margalit introduced the notion of an invisible­
hand explanation (I-H explanation) to the philosophical liter­
ature in 1978, and made a distinction between "aggregate" and 
"functional-evolutionary" (F-E) forms of I-H explanations. The 
present paper produces a substantially refined analysis of the 
forms and functions of I-H explanations. Sections (1) and (2) 
introduce the ideas of I-H and aggregate I-H explanation, respec­
tively. Section (J) argues that no one form of explanation can 
serve the explanatory functions Ullmanri-Margalit attributes to 
aggregate explanations, and divides those explanatory functions 
between genetic and "systematic-dispositional" explanations. 
Section (4) identifies difficulties with the idea of F-E expla­
nation in the social realm, and shows that any I-H explanations 
fitting the F-E mold would constitute simply a special class of 
"aggregate" explanation. 
INVISIBLE-HAND EXPLANATIONS RECONSIDERED* 
The identification of a distinguishable but hitherto undistin­
guished form of scientific explanation is a rare and stimulating 
event in philosophy, its value consisting in the fact that it may 
be expected to provide the philosopher with not only a new object 
of study, but also a liberated conception of the possibilities 
for explanation in domains other than those in which the new form 
is first discovered. How much �ark such a discovery creates for 
those interested in the structure of explanation varies inversely, 
of course, with the exactitude with which the initial identifica-
tion is made. 
Accordingly, we owe a double debt to Ullmann-Margalit for 
introducing a new category of explanation in her article, "Invisible­
Hand Explanations,"1 and for characterizing these explanations only 
in a rough-and-ready way which leaves many questions unresolved. My 
aim here will be to repay this debt in kind, if not in quantity1 I 
will try to show that an attempt to define more clearly the nature 
of these explanations yields not one but three distinct forms of 
explanation. I should qualify this immediately, however, for Margalit 
distinguishes two varieties of "invisible-hand" (hereafter, I-H) 
explanations, and the refinements I introduce pertain to only one 
of them. So let me begin by saying what distinguishes I-H explana­
tions from others, and what the two varieties of them are said to be. 
• I owe thanks to Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Merrilee Salmon, Sandra 
M itchell, and especially Carl G. He mpel and Joseph Camp, for their 
encouragement and useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
1 Synthese )9, 1978 , pp. 26)-291. 
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11 INVISIBLE-HAND EXPLANATIONS 
Margalit provides a general characterization of I-H explana-
tions in saying that they treat social phenomena (patterns and 
institutions) as "interposed between" the artificial and the
natural realms, being the "result of human action but not of human
design. "
2 
The phenomenon is accounted for as "a spontaneously 
formed order" arising in an unplanned way from the behavior of 
"numerous individuals, each busily doing his or her own private
narrow bit.•J Thus, the coming to be or continuing to be of social 
phenomena are suitable I-H explananda. The character of I-H expla­
!lfil:!§. is defined in an essentially negative way, as not involving
appeal to a designer. We find a social arrangement which looks as
if it might or must have (depending on our prejudices) come about
through the guiding intervention of a designer who is, however,
nowhere to be seen. The key to finding an explanation is to iden­
tify then a mechanism, the "invisible hand mechanism," which per­
forms the work of social coordination that we might have been 
tempted to assign to the unseen hand of God or man. In Adam Smith, 
from whom Margalit has borrowed the idea of the "invisible hand," 
it is the mechanisms of the unfettered marketplace that coordinate 
the activities of individuals pursuing their private interests in 
such a way, it is said, as to secure the common good. The aim is 
to explain a pattern of productive and mutually beneficial inter­
action even in the face of perhaps no one's trying to benefit any­
one other than himself. 
There are, on Margalit's account, two distinct kinds of I-H 
mechanisms, so general characterizations of I-H explanations must 
2 Ibid., p.26). 
3 Ibid., p.271. 
J 
here come to an end. The first kind of I-H mechanism is one "that 
aggregates the dispersed actions of individuals into the overall 
pattern (the explanandum phenomenon), subject to the assumption 
that the individuals concerned neither foresee this resultant of 
their actions nor intend to bring it about,•
4 
This is the kind of 
mechanism that Smith had in mind, obviously, and which we shall 
explore after these preliminaries. Margalit conceives of the second 
form of I-H mechanism as a process of natural selection operating 
on social arrangements15 
it is visualized as a large scale evolutionary mecha­
nism that as it were sc·ans the inventory of social 
patterns and institutions at any given period of time 
and screens through to the next those of them that 
are best adapted to their (respective) roles. 
And so, for instance, the rain ceremonials of the Hopi may be 
"screened through" because they serve well the role of "reinforcing 
the group identity by providing a periodic occasion on which the 
scattered members of a group assemble to engage in a common activ­
ity. •
6 
Invoking an evolutionary mechanism of this kind leads to a 
very different style of explanation from the "aggregate" I-H accounts 
which invoke an aggregating mechanism. The description of this pro-
4 Ibid., p.278. Stipulating that neither foresight nor intent can 
be present seems unnecessarily restrictive if the point is to 
rule out intentional design. Individuals in a freely competitive 
marketplace, for instance, might foresee the price of beets rising 
to a certain level, but be unable to influence the level of that 
price. Again someone might inefficaciously .!!:Y to make it reach
the level it in fact does. But such foresight and effort will 
simply be irrelevant to the (I-H) explanation we would give, since 
the relevant agents lack sufficient power to bring about what is 
to be explained. Apparently it will suffice to stipulate that no 
one individual or collective posses�
� all three of these factors 
(viz., power, effort, and foresight). 
5 Ibid., p.282. 
6 R.K. Merton, Social Theory And Social Structure, enlarged ed., 
NewYork 1968, pp. 118-119. 
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cess of natural selection presupposes that societies are systems 
in which institutions serve functional roles, and, following the 
standard literature,7 Margalit contends that the full-fledged 
(I-H) explanation is produced by conjoining the evolutionary account 
to an analysis of the explanandum's social function1
8 
an effort is made to find out (the explanandum's) 
contribution (if any) to the equilibrial and 
frictionless survival of the society in question. 
Once this is successfully established, the phenom­
enon under study is assumed all but explained, the 
(implicit) filling in being that by performing its 
function even its faint beginnings -- whatever their 
origins -- are reinforced and selected for1 conse­
quently this institution is better capable of help­
ing the social unit incorporating it to 'succeed,' 
and this 'success' of the social unit, in turn, 
accounts for the institution's own perpetuation in it. 
Margalit calls this form of I-H explanation "functional-evolutionary" 
(hereafter, F-E), and suggests that there is room for both these and 
aggregate I-H explanations since they serve complementary, not con­
flicting, explanatory functions. Aggregate accounts, she says, pro­
vide "a chronicle of emergence,•9 whereas F-E accounts explain the 
"continued existence and prevalence"
lO 
of the explanandum. This 
happy reconciliation -- indeed the very idea of F-E explanantion in 
the social realm -- seems highly problematic to me for reasons that 
I will advance in section 4. Sections 2 and J I devote to an extended 
treatment of aggregate I-H explanations. 
7 In her remarks on functional explanation Margalit takes herself 
correctly, I think, to be setting out the received view, insofar 
as there is one. Her references are to C. Boorse, "Wright on Func­
tions," Philosophical Review 85, 1976, pp. 70-861 R. Cummins, 
"Functional Analysis," Journal of Philosophy 72, 1975, pp. 741-765; 
W.C. Wimsatt, "Teleology and the Logical Structure of Function 
Statements," Studies in History And Philosophy of Science J, 1972, 
pp. 1-80; and L. Wright, "Functions," Philosophical Review 8 2, 
197). pp. 1)9-168. 
8 Ullmann-Margalit, op. cit., p. 282. 
9 Ibid. , p. 284. 
10 Ibid. , p. 286. 
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21 THE GENERAL FORM OF AGGREGATE I-H EXPLANATIONS 
Aggregate I-H explanations involve reference, as we have seen, to 
a mechanism "that aggregates the dispersed actions of individuals 
into the overall pattern • • •  "11 The full-blown account of this 
aggregating mechanism will begin, as Margalit explains it, with 
the description of an initial stage prior to the appearance of the 
explanandum, and will proceed through successive stages to a final 
stage where the explanandum is fully present. This initial stage 
will consist simply of individual persons with their individual 
intentions, beliefs, and goals (not to include any conception of 
the overall pattern ultimately produced), in a specified set of 
circumstances. Since the explanandum is to be explained as the 
result of the aggregated actions of individuals, and since these 
actions are to be explained in terms of beliefs and desires, it 
must be assumed that the participating individuals are rational. 
As Margalit correctly points out, this assumption of rationality 
has two components1 the assumption of normalcy of beliefs and goals 
and the assumption that actions will be instrumentally rational 
with respect to those beliefs and goals.1
2 
Very oddly, however, Margalit says the point of this ratio­
nality assumption is to guarantee that the story conveying the 
I-H process "sound like a description of the ordinary and normal 
course of events. "!) Its sounding this way is made a condition for 
the story's constituting a well-formed I-H explanation. Margalit 
is driven to this, I think, because she believes that "it is the 
detailed stages of the invisible-hand process which • . . supply 
. 
11 Ibid., p.287. 





They supply it, she says later, 15 
in the sense that the process consists of those temporally ordered 
stages. Her predicament is that since she takes the specification 
of a mechanism to be nothing more than the serial listing of its 
stages, she needs a standard external to the mechanism itself 
which will guarantee continuity from one stage to the next. (It 
isn't enough to include at each stage the desires operating at 
that stage if no attempt is made to explain how the choices and 
conditions of one stage lead to the desires operating at the next. ) 
The standard she chooses is this requirement that the progression 
of stages should give the impression of normalcy. 
Surely it is the case, however, that the specification of any 
such mechanism should include an identification of the dynamic 
principles that explain the transitions from one "machine state" 
to the next. Recognizing this would y_ield an account that is much 
cleaner, while substantially identical with Margalit's. The occur­
rence of the individual actions that combine to form the explanan-
dum may be explained as the result of� directed desires, 
and surely these forces (together with conditions in the broader 
social environment which may themselves be changing) provide the 
impetus for, and determine the shape of, the transitions from one 
stage of the process to the next. The principles governing the 
operation of these forces are, I suggest, principles of rationality 
such as the following1 
( i) 
( ii ) 
14 Ibid. 
Normally, if A has good evidence that Q, and it would
be significantly useful to A to believe that p, A will 
believe that Q• 
Normally, if � follows from Q• and A believes that Q, 
but Q lacks some immediate import for action possessed




by �. A will also believe �· 
N ormally, if A desires x and believes that y is his or
her best means to securTng �. all things considered, 
then A will (lacking y) also desire y. 
Normally, if A desires � and believes that his or her
best (all things considered) manner of securing � is 
the performance of action, �. A will (all else being 
equal) do �· 
As we've already seen, Margalit must make use of assumptions 
about the rationality of beliefs, goals, and actions, and so the 
departure from her account will not be too great if these are 
mobilized for explicit use. 
In Margalit's most fully outlined example, Schelling 's model 
of segregation,1
6 
it is quite clear that the motives of the indi­
vidual participants explain not only the transitions from one step 
to the next but also the stability of the final stage. De facto 
segregation is explained, in somewhat idealized fashion, as the 
result of individuals desiring to live in locations where "their 
own color group is not in a minority in their immediate neighbor­
hood, "l 7 it being assumed that those who are dissatisfied will
pursue this desire in an economical way, namely by moving to the 
nearest location where their desire will be satisfied. A neighbor­
hood at large is represented by an axis whose points represent 
houses, and the "immediate neighborhood" of a house is defined as 
the house itself together with the first four houses in each direc­
tion from it. The initial stage consists of 70 individuals, )5 
white and 35 black, distributed one to a house and randomly with 
respect to color. It turns out that only two rounds of moving are 
required to reach a situation in which everyone is satisfied, the 
unintended result being six stable segregated clusters. Both of 
16 T .C. Schelling, "Models of Segregation, " American Economic 
Review 59, 1969, pp.488-4 9). 
17 Margalit, op. cit., p.272. 
8 
these transitions are adequately explained by the stipulated 
desires, together with the situations in which the bearers of those 
desires find themselves. What the details of each stage depict 
is the progress towards the final result; what they, together with 
the principles of rationality, explain is the choices made by par­
ticipants in pursuit of their desires. These choices determine the 
circumstances of the next stage, and those circumstances in turn 
explain, together with the participants ' enduring desires and the 
principles of rationality, the specific (proximate) desires and 
choices that emerge at the next stage. The emergence of many social 
patterns might differ from this, I take it, only in involving more 
interesting interactions among the participants, and in the circum­
stances at various stages being dependent on changes in addition to 
those resulting from the choices made at prior ones. 
Margalit says that "the full-fledged description of the invisi­
ble-hand process falls under Hempel's_ category of genetic explana­
tions, "1
8 
though she does not pursue this claim far enough to see 
what follows from it. Hempel outlines the form of genetic explana­
tions as follows1 19 
• . • sch ematically speaking, a genetic explanation 
will begin with a pure description of an initial 
stage1 thence, it ·Nill proceed to an account of a 
second stage, while the balance is simply added 
descriptively because of its relevance for the 
explanation of some parts of the third stage, and 
so forth. 
The following diagram schematically represents 
the way nomological explanation is combined with 
straightforward description in a genetic account 
of this kind: 
18 Ibid., p.270. 
19 C.G. Hempel, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation, " in his ONn 
Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York 1965, pp.44 9-450. 
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The arrows indicate nomic connections between stages, and "S1, 
s2, • • •  , Sn are sets of sentences expressing all the information
that the genetic account gives about the first, second, • . •  , nth 
stage," each except s1 and Sn being composed of some sentences,
s•2, s•3, • • •  , S'n-l' which specify features "explained by refer­
ence to the preceeding stage," and some D2, D3, • • •  , Dn-l' which
give additional unexplained facts. This is the general form that 
genetic explanations take, but there are special cases, such as 
Schelling's model, in which no additional unexplained facts need 
be called upon. The schema then is simply s1 _. s2 _,. s3• 
Margalit fails to follow up this suggestion that aggregate 
I-H explanations are genetic explanations, because, it appears, 
she is reluctant to identify the form of the former in a precise 
way.
20 Lacking coherent grounds for such reluctance, there are 
important matters to be settled, paramount among them the issue 
of what will provide the nomological interconnections between dif­
ferent stages. One suggestion, though certainly not an unproblem­
atic one, is to construe the principles of rationality stated above 
as empirical statistical laws of human nature. This would open the 
way for explaining the individual actions which effect transitions 
from prior stages to latter, though these laws would not be the 
only ones required in moving from s1 to s•2, s2 to s•3, and so on. 
This is so because we would be making inferences not only from 
20 "It is my view that to look for generalizations over these 
stories, or to seek to unearth 'the logic' of the processes, 
would be a futile misplacement of the desideratum." Ullmann­
Margalit, op. cit., p . 27 0. 
10 
situations to beliefs, and from beliefs and desires to courses of 
action, but also from initial situations and courses of action to 
consequent situations. This last kind of move presents complica-
tions because appeals to agent's motives may account for what they 
set out to do, but what they set out to do is not always what, nor 
ever all that, they succeed in doing. Sentences in S' sets will 
capture, among other things, what agents have succeeded in bring-
ing about. 
31 TAKING HOW'S AND WHY'S SERIOUSLY 
As a preliminary to any further progress in clarifying the form of 
these aggregate I-H explanations, we must now consider the central 
explanatory functions they are claimed to serve. In addition to 
providing accounts of the genesis of social patterns, Margalit 
maintains that they explain � and � the patterns are perpetu­
ated. They "contribute to our understanding of the inherently self­
reinforcing nature of (given patterns) and hence of [ theirJ being
successful and lasting," she says.
21 
How, we must ask, can an aggregate I-H explanation, which so 
far has been characterized as a kind of genetic explanation, explain 
how and why a social pattern continues to exist? The final stage 
of one of these explanations will present in some form a great 
many facts about the components of the explained pattern, but given 
21 Ibid·., p.275. Margalit claims that this is true of all well­
formed aggregate I-H explanations, true and false alike. She 
also claims that even false ones provide rational reconstruc­
tions and reductions of the concepts of their explananda. 
Though interesting, these contentions are all easily shown to 
be mistaken, I think, and considerations of space incline me
to press on with the main line of inquiry. 
11 
what has so far been said, these facts need not, and often will 
not, take the form of an account of the structure ("the inherently 
self-reinforcing nature") of the explanandum. How are the descrip­
tive statements at Sn organized? Surely we cannot allow just fill:! 
compilation of descriptive sentences to count as identifying the 
nature of a pattern. In Schelling's model we can just � ho·,.,. the 
individual components add up to the explained pattern, but that's 
because the information is represented in a particular way that is 
not dictated in the least by its being an aggregate I-H explanation. 
The information is recorded one entry at a time, but in such a way 
as to automatically add up to a picture of the explanandum. Most 
one-entry-at-a-time recordings of the activities of individuals 
will not automatically yield a profile of any pattern formed by 
those activities, but will require interpretation. Tracing the 
genesis of a social arrangement will often facilitate such an inter-
pretation, but the genetic account will not itself be such an inter-
pretation. 
We need, I suggest, an entirely distinct form of explanation 
to do the job of explaining how the structure of a pattern or insti­
tution makes it "inherently self-reinforcing." Aiming for a form of 
explanation which departs as little as possible from the materials 
already at hand, my suggestion is that we conceive of the explananda 
as systems whose behavior is to be accounted for in terms of the 
interaction of a number of functional components. Let's call this 
systematic explanation,2
2 and take as a model the explanation of 
22 after J.Haugeland, "The Nature And Plausibility of Cognitivism," 
The Behavioral And Brain Sciences 2, 1978, p.216. Archaeologists, 
among others, would probably call this "the systems approach" to 
explanation and contrast it in their work with the older "dif­
fusionist" model of cultural develpoment. 
12 
the behavior of an automobile engine in terms of the coordinated 
contributions of its components1 the carburetor, ignition system, 
and so on. These components can be specified simply as input-out­
put functions ("black-boxes") and arranged either discursively or 
diagramatically so as to indicate how the behavior of the system 
as a whole results from their functional integration. This "arrang­
ing" amounts to the proposition that the products of each component 
are handed over to the components that take those as their input. 
That suffices to explain how the system works, how it can produce 
what it does (locomotion), given what is available to it (air, 
gasoline, smooth roads, etc.). Some of the system's components may 
themselves be systems (thus, subsystems of the engine), in which 
case their behavior, originally captured simply as law-like func­
tional (in the mathematical sense) dependencies of output on input, 
may in turn be systematically explained at a second stage of analy-
sis. 
The strategy is perhaps not so different from how we explain 
the validity of a multi-lined formal proof. At each step we appeal 
to a rule of inference, a kind of input-output function, to justify 
setting down a new formula (output), given specified prior lines 
of the proof (input), and we proceed from start to finish so as to 
certify that (and see how) it carries us along from the original 
premisses (input to the system as a whole) to the final conclusion 
(output of the system as a whole). Doing this brings us to an 
understanding of how the "inference machine," composed of those 
inference rules, can yield the product it does given the materials 
at its disposal. It analyzes a superfunction, so to speak, into a 
structure of component subfunctions. Since specifying the functional 
1) 
components of the "inference machine" is just identifying the 
rules of inference, and since there is nothing more to proving 
validity than showing that every line is indeed justified under a 
truth-preserving rule, then, to make explicit the implications of 
the analogy, there isn't anything more to giving a systematic 
explanation than specifying the functional components and getting 
the connections between them right, where getting the connections 
right is being sure that inputs, unless they are inputs to the 
system as a whole, are shown as coming from the components of which 
they are outputs. Similarly, since the activity of each component 
is captured as a law-like function, there is a strong nomological 
element to these explanations. 2) 
To clarify now why these systematic explanations might pro­
vide what Margalit needs, let us recall that the point of using the 
title "invisible-hand" is to contrast these explanations with ones 
from intentional design in just those cases where there is a temp­
tation to think explanations from intentional design appropriate. 
Such a temptation exists exactly in those cases where the social 
pattern or institution has a structure so complex or highly devel­
oped that it would be surprising if the coordination of individual 
agents could have come about without planning. Put more directly, 
the title "invisible-hand" is appropriate only where the explanan-
dum is a relatively complex social structure, and where there is 
at least "a difference in type between the overall pattern to be 
2) I do not, in using this analogy, mean to imply that the compo­
nents of all systems are serially arranged. Indeed, the atten­
tive reader will note that the lines of the proof are serially 
arranged, but the "inference machine's" components are not. (Cf. 
the lines of a computer program vs. the organization of its 
subroutines.) 
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explained and the individual actions which are supposed to bring 
it about, "24 if not several interact in� � Qf actions different 
in type from the pattern. 
Consequently, most of the social phenomena for which I-H 
explanations are appropriate should be complex in the sense that 
they arise out of the interactions of a large number of individuals 
whose behavior can be grouped into several disjoint similarity 
classes. When such classes can be identified the chances are good 
that the pattern can be explained systematically. In Margalit's 
example of the creation of money in the banking system25 we can 
identify three basic groups1 those who save, those who borrow, and 
those, the institutions, which mediate between savers and borrowers. 
Spelling out the behavior of these groups as they interact with 
one another serves to explain how the system does what it does, and 
thereby gives us insight into the nature of the phenomenon. In 
Schelling's model of segregation everyone is doing the same thing1 
no distinct groups can be identified·, and so no systematic explana­
tion is available. This is simply a symptom, however, of the fact 
that,plausible as the genetic account of it may be, de facto segre-
24 Ullmann-Margalit, op. cit., p.261.
25 Ibid., p.2641 "No one needed to have invented the commercial 
banking system, nor need anyone have invented it to function so 
as to continuously create money. The usual story that accounts 
for both begins with the early goldsmiths who used to be paid 
a small fee for the safekeeping of people's gold and valuables. 
It proceeds with those intelligent goldsmiths who came to realize, 
first, that they don't necessarily have to give back to the cus­
tomer exactly the same piece of gold that he had deposited, and, 
later, that since not all deposits are withdrawn together and new 
deposits tend to balance withdrawals, only a small percentage of 
the cash entrusted to them is needed in the form of vault cash. 
The rest of the story has to do with these shrewd bankers' invest­
ment in securities and loans of most of the money deposited with 
them, leading to the account of the actual creation of money 
through the consideration of the overall impact of this newly­
developed banking system as a whole rather than of each small 
establishment taken in isolation." 
15 
gation (on this model) is not complex in a way that makes it a 
representative object of I-H explanation• 
Systematic explanations are not all we will require, however, 
if we're to understand what keeps arrangements going -- if we're 
to see them as "inherently self-reinforcing." If the question is 
"Why is the pattern perpetuated?" we need first and foremost to 
understand why people in sufficient numbers will do what members 
of the component-classes do. Our explanation must identify incen­
tives that attach to playing the roles that constitute component­
class membership, and show how these incentives suffice to main-
tain a level of participation sufficient for the perpetuation of 
the arrangement. This will involve dispositional claims about 
human nature as well as facts about the number of potential com­
ponent-class members and the conditions in which they are making 
their decisions. The strategy is to show that a certain percentage 
of people who could potentially fill the roles in question will, 
given the range of choices, choose to participate, and furthermore 
that, given the number of such potential participants, that per­
centage will be enough. It will also usually involve showing how 
it is possible for the structure of incentives to accomodate vari-
ous changes in environmental constraints. The notions of regulatory 
and stabilizing mechanisms may be invoked here, but such mechanisms, 
when they are implicated, will already have been counted as func-
tional components under the systematic explanation of the phenomenon. 
In the example at hand, the explanation begins by identifying 
the reasons people have for saving, for borrowing, and for running 
and working in banks. The operation of banks could itself be given 
a systematic e!planation, and this, together with a profile of the 
16 
environmental constraints on their operation, will explain how it 
is possible for the system of incentives to remain intact and 
effective. Many social phenomena are not so well-defined, of course, 
but even for them there may often be explanatory utility in devel-
oping idealized systematic models, a maneuver which is by no means 
without precedent. Where this strategy fails it is not at all clear 
that Margalit's claims for the explanatory power of aggregate I-H 
explanations can be redeemed. 
In trying to clean up Margalit's account of aggregate I-H 
explanations we have now distinguished a total of three forms of 
explanation 1 the genetic, the systematic, and the dispositional 
explanations which build upon the systematic. The first two of 
these, or better, the first and a hybrid of the second and third, 
I count as distinct forms of I-H explanation. Programmatic as these 
suggestions are, they represent a significant refinement of Margalit' s 
account. 
But here it may be objected that I have given the why question 
short shrift in suggesting that it may be answered by appeal to the 
motives and circumstances of those who participate in the practice 
to be explained. For sometimes, it will be pointed out, the question 
that really interests us looks beyond the circle of participants to 
the possibility of outside intervention. "Why,• we ask, "do the 
American people allow such a state of affairs to continue?" ( "Why 
the lack of intervention?") Or again, "Why did Congress create new 
incentives to stabilize participation in this threatened institu-
tion?" ("Why the intervention?") Answers to questions of both these 
varieties may cite the influence of private interests on those who 
might intervene. In other instances they may cite false or true 
17 
beliefs about (and a concern or lack of concern to advance) the 
common good. Failures to intervene may also be explained by refer­
ence to a lack of awareness of the situation, or lack of the power, 
resources, or organization essential to making a difference. 
This seems to me not so much an objection, however, as simply 
an interesting complication, Explanations that make reference to 
outside intervention or its absence may supplement, but never sup-
plant, ones based on the motives of, and patterns of interaction 
among, participants, for understanding the internal dynamics of a 
pattern or institution is plainly more central to understanding 
that pattern or institution. Furthermore, the explanatory relevance 
of intervention will in many instances provide us with a broader 
I-H explanation than we would have constructed otherwise. In some 
of these cases the additions will be integral to a larger system-
atic scheme, whereas in others their import from the systematic 
point of view will merely be that they don't interfere with the 
rest. In this latter sort of case, after identifying the relevant 
classes of actors and charting their interactions, we would add a 
further class (viz. , those who are not interfering, but might be 
expected to) whose members go about their own private affairs in 
preference to interfering, or lacking information that would 
incline them to interfere. The former sort of case may arise when 
the behavior of those who might or might not interfere must be 
bought through payoffs, threats, or deception. 
This may be illustrated by the pattern (striking frequency) 
of handgun murders in the United States today, a phenomenon which 
lends itself admirably to systematic analysis. We begin with a 
puzzle: given that manufacturers and retailers can only (legally) 
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put registered guns in the hands of potential killers, and given 
also that those who intend to use guns in the commission of crimes 
strongly prefer ones that are not registered in their own names, 
how is it that so many murders involve guns that cannot be traced 
(through registration) to their users? This puzzle is then resolved 
by identifying a mechanism which takes traceable guns as input, 
and transforms them into untraceable ones, Two classes of actors 
are implicated heres those moved by a concern for their own safety 
to purchase firearms and conceal them ineffectively, and those who 
steal them, usually in burglarizing houses.26 These links close 
the self-reinforcing cycle in a way which largely accounts for the 
level of violence to be explained1 violence generates fear, and 
that fear, in turn, generates a steady supply of untraceable hand­
guns which may be put to illicit use. Moreover, the danger to 
aggressors is also heightened in such a way as to encourage them 
to use greater force. This explanation may come to seem incomplete, 
however, when we consider how easily this cycle might be broken by 
appropriate legislation • Our investigation of Congressional and 
popular inaction might then lead to a broader systematic picture 
of how political and economic power are maintained, depending on 
how much significance we attached in the end to industry influence 
through public relations efforts, lobbying, contributing to politi-
cal campaigns, and so on. 
A final important observation I must make regarding these 
supplemental explanations is that in explaining the existence of 
26 While I have not seen the relevant studies, police inves tigators 
for the city of New Orleans inform me that in nine of every ten 
instances in which handguns are involved in crimes, they are 
used by persons other than their lawful owners. 
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social phenomena, only a narrow subclass of them will give a 
decisive role to the fact that the phenomena contribute to social 
well-being (i.e., have social functions). Among these some will be 
I-H (by my lights, perhaps not by Margalit's1 see footnote 4) 
because the intervening or non-intervening individuals act from 
an informed desire to promote the common good, but lack the power 
or organization to count as social designers. (Again, there is no 
difference of great significance between this and the (rare) case 
in which some or all of the participants in a pattern act in ways 
motivated by the common good, but independently of one another, 
and with no control over what the others do.) In cases where true 
beliefs about social function � mediated by the agency of some 
individual or collective having designer status, the explanation 
will not be I-H, of course. Rather, the explanation will be much 
like that of the existence of an artifact which serves the purpose 
it was intended to. 
41 CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF 1-H EXPLANATIONS
Let us now recall that Margalit takes there to be two forms of I-H 
explanation, aggregate and F-E, and that she claims they address 
different questions and so can serve complementary explanatory roles. 
To repeat, aggregate accounts are supposed to provide "a chronicle 
of emergence," whereas F-E accounts are supposed to explain the "con­
tinued existence and prevalence" of explananda by citing their 
raisons g'etre. We have just seen, however, that (as Margalit has 
maintained throughout) aggregate explanations can explain how and 
why social phenomena persist. (Her apparent inconsistency on this 
point is baffling. ) Consequently, these explanatory functions cannot 
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be distributed in quite the tidy manner Margalit envisions. 
To determine how they should be distributed we must consider 
whether F-E explanations can do what Margalit says they can. I will 
argue, first, that they could not be so broadly available nor 
easily generated as Margalit suggests, since they depend on three 
assumptions that are not generally reliable. A closer inspection 
of the third of these assumptions will then show that the idea of 
anF-E, I-H explanation is untenable. The effect of this is to 
narrow the field of I-H explanations to those elaborated in sections 
2 and J1 the genetic and the systematic-dispositional. 
Functional-evolutionary explanations depend, first, on the 
pattern or institution's having a function in the sense of contrib­
uting to social well-being. No doubt there are many institutions 
that make social contributions, but there are probably far more 
patterns and institutions that do not, as my example of the pattern 
of handgun murders illustrates. Margalit does explicitly admit the 
possibility of an institution's having no social function, but she 
uncritically admits the biological model into the realm of social 
explanation. We should notice, first, that even in the biological 
realm we cannot assume that selective pressure is so intense as to 
insure that every anatomical structure has a life-sustaining func­
tion. Secondly, there are disanalogies between the biological and 
social realms that should make us even less sanguine about finding 
functions for social explananda. One such disanalogy is the fact 
that persons are more autonomous than tissue 1 they are able to act 
in ways that suit their own personal requirements irrespective of 
what society might require. Consequently, in trying to account for 
a social arrangement we are on much safer ground in assuming that 
2 1  
the individuals who participate i n  it act for reasons, than we are 
in assuming that the arrangement contributes to the "equilibrial 
and frictionless survival" of the host society. Aggregate explana­
tions will, therefore, be more widely applicable. 
Again, even when we can attribute a function to a social 
arrangement we cannot assume, as Margalit does, that even its 
"faint beginnings" served the � function that it does now. 
Margalit talks as if the whole evolutionary development of the 
explanandum will just fall out of the analysis of current function, 
but that cannot be the case. Some institutions are able to survive 
precisely because they manage to adapt themselves, in a changing 
environment, to entirely different functions. In such cases the 
explanation would be incomplete wit tout histories of the changes 
in both function and the environment to which the institution 
adapted. So to identify the item's current function can scarcely 
be to have "all but explained" it (its presence). 
Finally, even when we can attribute a function and assume 
sameness of function over time, we may be wrong in assuming that 
the explanandum has evolved in any sense that warrants claiming 
that an "evolutionary mechanism" has provided the functional analy­
sis with causal teeth. My concern now is not, as earlier, with the 
assumption of selective pressure, but rather with what might be 
called the assumption of diversity. There must, as Margalit says, 
be an "inventory" of social arrangements from which ones well 
suited to given roles can be selected. If there is no range of 
candidates to select from, then there can be no process of selec­
tion, and consequently no explanation from natural selection -­
i.e., no explanation that is evolutionary in the relevant sense. 
Again, perhaps some social arrangements have been selected for 
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their roles from fields of candidates, but are we really to 
believe, for instance, that Hopi rain dances triumphed over and 
against competing, diverse practices which disappeared because 
they were less effective in reinforcing group identity? Or did it 
win out over other practices only in the sense that those who came 
to practice it found themselves with less time and energy to devote 
to other things? Again, taking examples which may be explained by 
reference to individual dispositions, though additively (like seg­
regation on Schelling's model) rather than systematically, what 
about widespread institutions like marriage and living in single­
family dwellings? As before, a serious disanalogy with the biological 
realm emerges1 in the social realm there are two important forms 
of �selection which reduce the significance of actual selection. 
On the one hand, people, like other social animals, have heritable 
dispositions to act in certain (often socially enhancing) ways 
rather than in others. To some extent, then, there is an indirect 
biological preselection which restricts the range of social arrange­
ments which may arise. On the other hand, unlike other social ani­
mals, people are intelligent enough to sometimes figure out that 
certain arrangements won't work, without having tried and suffered 
the consequences. These considerations suggest that the assumption 
of diversity can only be made selectively, and on the basis of 
historical investigation. 
The general lesson that emerges here is that true F-E expla­
nations must be both rarer than Margalit implies, and more labori­
ously acquired. Beyond this, however, there are conclusive reasons 
for denying F-E explanations the status of a distinct class of I-H 
explanation. To see this we must ask what explanatory force the 
2) 
appeal to an evolutionary mechanism has in those cases where the 
relevant assumptions are secure, and the explanandum's serving 
some function has made the differ ence in its continuing to exist. 
In saying that its serving a function has made this difference 
we view the explanandum, of course, against the comparison class 
of other diverse phenomena which did not serve that function effi­
ciently and were eliminated by environmental pressures. In an 
important sense, however, what has happened to these other phen­
omena is quite irrelevant to the explanandum's surviving1 from a 
more local perspective it has, through whatever means, simply been 
"lucky" enough to be so constituted as to survive those external 
pressures which the others didn't survive. Again, considering the 
kinds of causal relevance that persons may bear to the explanandum, 
we can say that this survival may be either fortuitous or, on the 
other hand, the result of successful social design (i.e. , not for­
tuitous). That is, the arrangement's having a certain structure 
and serving some social function may have resulted in a way that 
no one controlled (or could have controlled) from various individ­
uals going about their private affairs (with or without any rele­
vant concern for the common good). In this case the causal story 
to be filled in is an aggregate I-H account. If, on the other hand, 
it is the planned result of intentional intervention, then the 
explanation is no kind of I-H explanation at all. 
Thus, the evolutionary element in F-E explanation seems merely 
to stand in for two distinct and familiar kinds of mechanisms, and 
so to do no explanatory work of its own. The F-E model is untenable 
in the social realm, therefore, and so Margalit's attempt to dis­
tribute the explanatory functions of I-H exp lanations between 
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aggregate and F-E accounts collapses completely. Moreover, these 
two modes of causal mediation by which function can enter are just 
what we found them to be at the close of section three, except 
that now, when the evidence warrants it, we may add the non-inter­
vention of a potentially lethal environment as a supplemental 
account on a par with other explanations by non-intervention. But 
this, I hasten to point out, will be a kind of causal account 
which in its own right can make no claim to identifying a social 
phenomenon's � for existing. (providing raisons Q'etre was 
said to be the explanatory function of F-E accounts, recall.) 
Since social arrangements cannot properly be said to have reasons 
at all, the reasons that sustain them can only be those belonging 
to the individuals who participate in or intervene (refrain from 
intervening) on their behalf. 
One final remark is in order. If I have tried to minimize the 
significance of a social phenomenon 's function in the context of 
explaining its own existence, I have·a1so tried to show in setting 
out my systematic-dispositional model that functional analyses of 
social items figure importantly in explaining the workings and 
capacities of systems in which those items are components. Margalit 
closes her paper emphasizing the distinction between aggregate and F-E 
I-H explanations, and so it is ironically that I now close respond­
ing not only that F-E accounts are no kind of I-H explanation at all, 
but also that the primary place for functional analyses in the realm 
of social explanation must be in the guise of a kind of aggregate 
account. 
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